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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details  
Report date: 19/07/2011 Accident number: 770 
Accident time: 09:00 Accident Date: 30/11/2008 
Where it occurred: AF/0809/00954, 
MF0052, Kohna Deh 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: (50) Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 19/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
inadequate training (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT- 18 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by AMAC East to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the De-miner from [Demining group] DT-18. The accident occurred at 
9:00 AM on 30 December 2008 at minefield number AF/0809/00954/MF0052, located in 
Kohna Deh village, Kuz Kunar district of Nangarhar province. 
SUMMARY: 
AF/0809/00954/MF0052 is located in a mined area contaminated by Russian forces and their 
successor government in order to block the attacks of their opposition on Kuz Kunar district 
headquarter and security positions around it. [Demining group] DT–18 started clearance 
operation in said area on 18 November 2008, during the period of operation they cleared 
28368m2 area and found/destroyed 3 AP mines and 132 different types of UXO. On 30 
December 2008 deminer de- miner [the Victim] was busy in excavation of a detected signal in 
his clearance lane, his scraper touched on the top of a mine and caused it to explode. It 
seems from investigation report that the deminer has started to excavate a detected signal in 
his clearance lane, but not succeeded in first attempt, he got a louder signal again in the 
same point and then started excavation directly from the top of the signal, therefore, his 
scraper touched the top of mine and the accident occurred. As the deminer was fully dressed 
with PPE and his visor was in down position, therefore, he remained safe, without any injuries 
to his body. He only got some dust in his eyes. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The investigation team concluded that the contributing factors to this accident were 
Carelessness of de-miner in terms of started excavation direct from the top of detected signal 
and poor command and control. As the command group failed to stop him from wrong drills 
and also he was not provided with proper information regarding the task. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The following points are to be considered: 
• The de-miners should pinpoint the signal properly, mark it and then to start 
excavation according to the procedure. 
• The de-miners should not hurry up during the excavation and be careful and not to 
use the scraper forcefully and carelessly. 
• The team should undergo a refresher training focussing on prodding/excavation drill. 
The responsibilities of command group should also be covered in the training. 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 956 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. The Victim "got some dust in his eyes". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the Victim was working incorrectly and his errors were uncorrected.  
The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the Victim was not given the correct information about the task, and 
this is a management responsibility. Because the investigators recommended improved 
training, a cause may have been Inadequate training, which would also be a Management 
Control Inadequacy. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
 
